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Abstract 
Turkish government, under the rule of Justice and Development Party (Turkish: Adalet 
ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), (2002-2017) has conducted many educational reforms. 
Different researchers have evaluated effectiveness of those policies differently. Some claim 
that policies result in a more inclusive and diverse educational system, others argue that 
the reforms would rekindle child labor, increase child brides and condemn girls to 
illiteracy. In our research, we measure the effects of educational reforms on equity in 
financing education (i.e., out-of-pocket expenditures).  
After estimating Gini, Concentration and Kakwani indices, and graphing Lorenz and 
Concentration curves, we find out that education financing in Turkey is regressive. Since 
the year of 2004 there have been no significant improvements: neither in the income 
equality levels, nor in the distribution of education financing. The poorest quintiles have 
the highest shares of education expenditure, and the high school education is the most 
inequitable. Our results conflict with the claim that Turkey became more accessible to poor 
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I.    Introduction 
“Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world” – 
said Nelson Mandela. History proves that educated and talented people have had a major 
impact on our lives. Today people use automobiles, light bulbs, TVs, telephones and 
internet without thinking of their inventors. Education not only stimulates the innovation, 
but also helps people overcome poverty and understand the world that they live in. 
Unfortunately, access to education is limited and not everyone is able to get the education 
s/he wants. The greater the amount of investment required in education, harder it is for the 
poor families to find it. Individuals cannot have any returns and gains, if they are unable to 
invest in the education in the first place; that is where the issue of education equity arises 
and needs to be addressed. 
Equity is defined as fairness, impartiality, and justice and is related to equal 
opportunity. Equity in education concentrates on the equal access to formal education 
opportunities and resources. Different policy reforms were implemented around the world 
to improve the education equity, governments have been main providers of education at a 
primary and a secondary school levels and in many countries, they have been subsidizing 
the tertiary education as well. Interestingly, Duman (2008) claims that public expenditure 
on schooling can harm the poor, if poor have only limited (or no) access to public education 
yet finance public spending on education via taxes.  
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If it is possible for public education to favor financially stronger students, private 
education is not an exception. Private institutions are not affordable for families with lower 
incomes, children born into poor families do not share equal opportunities with the ones 
born into high-income families. If governments do not implement effective education 
policies, education becomes another source of social differentiation and excludes certain 
groups from taking advantages that it provides for the others.  
Psacharopoulous (1986) claims that inefficiencies of educational policies are mainly 
caused by four reasons: (1) underinvestment in education, (2) misallocation of resources 
among schooling levels, (3) the inefficient use of resources within individual schools, and 
(4) inequality in the distribution of educational costs and benefits among various income 
groups. In addition, introduction of poorly controlled subsidies in the private sector, loose 
legislation related to the possibility of opening new schools, a deterioration in teacher 
working conditions and decentralized education policies (that have been developed without 
the proper mechanisms to offset territorial inequalities) have strong repercussions on the 
differences in education quality (Bonal, 2007).  
All the causes of inefficiencies addressed by Psacharopoulous (1986) can be observed 
in the Turkish education system. During the last 15 years, Turkey has undergone through 
many changes. AKP (Justice and Development Party), has initiated many reforms in 
education, however the government’s share in the educational funding has been decreasing. 
Decrease in the public expenditure on education is accompanied by the increase in the 
household spending (highest portion of education expenditure is spent on the private 
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tutoring services). In addition, public expenditure has become more biased towards tertiary 
education: government spends relatively higher amounts on tertiary education while 
expenditures on primary and secondary education are significantly below the OECD 
averages. Number of private preparatory institutions (Ozel Dershaneler) has doubled since 
2002; number of private schools has sharply increased as well. Increases in the private 
schooling are likely to lower the levels of intergenerational mobility in education and in 
income (Turkey has one of the lowest intergenerational educational mobility among the 
OECD countries, with only 66% of young people having the same level of education as 
their parents). Following Psacharopoulous’ (1986) arguments one can assume that 
education policies in Turkey are inefficient. However, researches provide different 
perspectives on the effectiveness of educational policies. Some believe that the educational 
policies conducted by AKP will lead to a “more inclusive and diverse educational system”1.  
One of the highly-debated reforms conducted by the AK party is the “4+4+4” education 
act, implementation of which costed 50% of the government’s education budget in 2012. 
The act extends compulsory education from 8 to 12 years, but divides it into three four year 
stages. It requires children as young as 11 to choose between academic-track and vocation-
track schooling. Critics state that the fifth grade is too early for children to be “steered away 
from a basic curriculum and be asked to make vocational choices about how to spend the 
                                                          




rest of their life”2. NGOs and women rights groups claim that this reform would “rekindle 
child labor, increase child brides and condemn girls to illiteracy”3. Experts also state that 
the new system would hurt the less privileged: children from poor families or who only 
know Kurdish language, when they enter the first grade, will be hurt when they compete 
for middle school. They will be unable to overcome their handicap by the end of the fourth 
grade and will not be able to perform well on the competitive examinations required for 
entering middle schools.  
The other two well-known projects conducted by AK party are the “Conditional Cash 
Transfers” and the “FATIH Project”. The Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) program was 
launched with the assistance of the World Bank in 2001. On the one hand, the program 
aimed to prevent poor households from becoming poorer, and on the other hand, it intended 
to improve their children’s future productivity and incomes. The CCT project is dealing 
with households’ economic problems since it provides financial resources, however, there 
are also institutional and socio-cultural reasons why households refrain from sending their 
children, and particularly their girls, to school. Among these, supply-side factors such as 
inadequate number of schools or transportation are very crucial (Pop, 2012).  
                                                          




3 Sevinc K. (2012) “4+4+4 formula in Turkish educational system would increase the number of child marriages and 




The “FATIH Project” (which stands for Fırsatları Artırma ve Teknolojiyi İyileştirme 
Hareketi, or 'Movement to Increase Opportunities and Technology') was launched in 2011 
to enhance the technological infrastructure of classrooms and to provide all students with 
tablet computers. The project has some issues faced not only in Turkey, but in other 
countries where similar “1-to-1 computing” programs have been implemented. The mere 
presence of technology might not improve school-level outcomes and there is a danger 
that, if teachers are not continually supported (not only via 'one-off trainings') in practical, 
useful, contextually relevant ways, the "tablets risk becoming little more than digital 
desktops" (Trucano, 2013)4. 
In our study, we are analyzing the burden of the out-of-pocket expenditures on 
education by levels of education, and across income groups. Specifically, we are 
interested in evaluating the claims regarding the improvements in education equity. All the 
above-mentioned changes and all the divergences in opinions on whether or not those 
policies contribute to the improvement of educational outcomes make Turkey a center of 
our research. The key question addressed by our research is whether the AKP education 
policies lead to a more “inclusive and diverse system” or they exacerbate the inequality 
and further disadvantage the poor. We inquire this aspect from the financial perspective 
(see section II for more details), the purpose of financing is to ensure equal access to 
education and provide equal opportunities. Finding out whether or not education financing 






in Turkey presents a bias against the poor and a bias in favor of higher education will help 
us evaluate the AKP policies and overall equity in the Turkish education system.  
Section II of our paper presents the Education and Its Financing, Section III describes 
the Turkish Education System, Section IV provides the Data and Methodology, and Section 
V is composed of the Conclusion. 
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II. Education and Its Financing 
Researchers often use the externality argument to emphasize benefits of education for 
the society. School curricula provide the sense of civic duty and spread social mores, 
ideologies and languages; literacy and numeracy facilitate social and economic 
transactions. These activities do not benefit one individual as much as they benefit society 
at large.  
In the human capital model, expenditures on education have two components, 
investment and consumption. Investment in education is assumed to have positive effects 
on human skills and worker productivity, it provides higher income and the acquisition of 
status for an individual, and economic growth, technological progress and collective well-
being for the society. Consumption side represents arguments in the utility functions of 
those obtaining education. Given those claims, it is evident that on an individual basis there 
is a relationship between an expenditure in favor of a child from a poor household and the 
future earning potential, which will lift that child above the poverty line. However, the 
crucial observation is that the greater the amount of investment required in education, 
harder it is for the poor families to find it. Families cannot have any returns and gains, if 
they cannot invest in the education in the first place.  
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Equity in education concentrates on the equal access to formal education opportunities 
and resources. Equality of opportunity is considered to maximize the total social good and 
increase social gains. Education is a determinant of opportunity of outcomes and economic 
growth, therefore lack of education is often viewed as a cause of inequality and 
underdevelopment. These arguments are supported by the Mincerian earning function, 
which underlines that “always and everywhere, more education is on average associated 
with higher income” (Van Der Berg, 20135). In order to get access to education and 
complete higher levels of schooling, individuals need to cover all the associated costs of 
attending educational institutions. Tuition, transportation costs, books and other 
supplementary materials can be quite expensive. Household incomes have direct effect on 
affordability of education, therefore in our research we concentrate on calculating the out-
of-pocket expenditures of the different income quintiles. We agree that children of high- 
and low-income families are born with similar abilities but different opportunities, and that 
those opportunities are highly impacted by household expenditures. Higher the out-of-
pocket expenditure required for affording educational services, lower the opportunities of 
low-income students. Calculation of out-of-pocket expenditures helps us evaluate the 
progressivity of education system discussed in the following section under the Education 
Equity title.  
 





2.1 Education Equity 
Equity in education has two components: fairness and inclusion (Simon et. al. 2007). 
Fairness aspect makes sure that personal and social aspects (gender, socio-economic status, 
ethnic origin) do not restrict anyone from achieving their educational potential. Inclusion 
factor ensures a basic standard of education for all.   
Regarding the sources of the inequity Benadusi (2001) presents four main sociological 
approaches. These approaches are: the functionalist approach, the social or cultural 
reproduction theory, the cultural relativist and pluralist approaches, and the methodological 
individualism approach. Based on Durkheim’s and Parsons’ research tradition, 
functionalist approach considers “aspirations factors” (such as social class, gender, ethnic 
group) and “achievement factors” (“personal natural” endowment and will of the individual 
to use and develop it) as determinants of educational inequalities. On the other hand, social 
or cultural reproduction theory explains the educational inequalities entirely by social 
inequalities. The cultural relativist and pluralist approach emphasizes the role of school 
and considers school as an active producer or reproducer of inequalities. And the last 
approach the methodological individualism approach, even though recognizes that choices 
made by individuals are constrained by cultural and social aspects, it still places individuals 
and individuals’ choices as the core determinant of the inequalities. 
Researches not only identify different sources of inequality, but also distinguish between 
different types of equity: horizontal equity and vertical equity. Main principle of the 
horizontal equity is the “equal treatment of equals”. Individuals with the same amount of 
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wealth, or similar levels of income, should face the same tax rate. On the other hand, 
vertical equity is based on the idea that richer groups should pay higher taxes, therefore 
they should be contributing proportional to their income. Taxes can be classified into three 
groups: progressive, proportional, or regressive. A progressive tax increases as income 
increases (larger absolute amount and a larger percentage of income); a regressive tax is 
an example of a tax rate decreasing as income increases; and a proportional tax keeps the 
tax rate at a same level regardless of income. Our research is not concerned with the 
taxation system; however, we will use the similar evaluation approach to measure 
progressiveness of the education expenditures of different income groups.  
The progressiveness of the education system plays crucial role in the social mobility 
aspect of individuals. “A college degree can be a ticket out of poverty”, however, it is 
children with richer parents who generally perform better, get better quality education, and 
are more likely to progress to higher levels of education. If an education system is 
inequitable (regressive), it pressures the poor to incur higher financial costs (by increasing 
the shares of education expenses in their out-of-pocket expenditures).  
The case of Turkey that we discuss in our paper is already worrisome, as countries with 
high income inequality have low social mobility. Ineffective Turkish education policies 
may even further lower the social mobility levels and contribute to the intergenerational 
persistence (the hierarchy of families is maintained over time). The acquisition of human 
capital is a key determinant of intergenerational mobility. Thus, education and its financing 
is at the core of our discussion. Evaluation of equitability of the system is specifically 
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important for the lower income quintiles. If education policies are biased against the poor 
(in our case result in higher shares of education expenditures), the acquisition of human 
capital through the enrollment in different levels of schooling becomes unaffordable. 
 As education strongly affects intergenerational mobility, predictably it also impacts 
overall inequality levels. Even though our research does not measure the effects of the 
Turkish education policies on inequality levels, we still present some of our literature 
findings regarding the relationship between public education and income inequality.   
2.2. Education Policies and Inequality  
The lack of education contributes to the perpetuation of inequality, and if social and 
income inequalities have negative effects on economic and political environments, then 
countries need effective educational policies for attaining equal income distribution. 
Different policy reforms were implemented around the world to improve the education 
equity, teacher trainings, encouraging progressive teaching methods, increased physical 
resources and etc (Othman and Muijis, 2012). Governments have been main providers of 
education at a primary and secondary school levels and in many countries, they have been 
subsidizing the tertiary education. Sylwester (2000) presents that public education can 
actually lower the level of income inequality provided that agents have resources to forgo 
income and attend school. However, “if agents are too poor, then promoting public 
education can actually cause the distribution of income to become more skewed since the 
poor are taxed for revenue but do not enjoy the benefits of the public education system” 
(Sylwester, 2000:43). Duman (2008:371) provides a similar argument, claiming that 
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“public expenditure on schooling harms the poor most if they have only limited (or no) 
access to public education yet finance public spending on education via taxes”.  
Most of the researchers agree that investments in public education are beneficial for an 
economic growth. Using Gini coefficients and Lorenz curves Sylwester (2002) shows that 
countries with higher expenditures on public education as a percentage of GDP have lower 
income inequality in following years, however, effects are slow to be realized. In the less 
developed countries income inequality lessens slower than in the OECD countries. 
Sylwester (1999) explains that in the short run education expenditures are not associated 
with economic growth or perhaps they even lower growth.  
Davies et al. (2003) find that without fresh shocks to income in each generation (source 
of persistent inequality) (i) inequality disappears in the long-run under public education 
and under private education as well (under a suitable concavity condition) (ii) inequality 
falls more quickly under public than under private education, and (iii) provided initial 
inequality is low, the long-run growth rate is higher under private than under public 
education. With fresh shocks to income in each generation, Benabou (1996) shows that 
inequality has “a lower steady-state value under public than under private education. 
Further, public education produces faster rather than slower long-run growth” (Davies et 
al. 2003:1).  In a long-run public education results in economic growth, but in the short run 
it might not be the source of the positive growth. Authors agree that public education 
decreases inequality, therefore countries should invest in education, however, policy 
makers should carefully examine educational policies and concentrate on long term 
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benefits rather than focus on economic gains in the short run. From these arguments, we 
derive: 
Hypothesis 1: Public spending on education decreases inequality levels. 
 
Table 1: Education Expenditure, Primary to Tertiary, % of GDP (2013)6 
Education Expenditure  Public Private 
Australia 4.7 5.6 
Belgium 5.8 5.8 
Czech Republic 3.4 4.0 
France 4.8 5.3 
Germany 4.2 4.3 
Norway 7.3 6.3 
OECD Average 4.8 5.2 
Poland 4.4 4.8 
Turkey 4.6 5.0 
United Kingdom 5.5 6.7 
United States 4.6 6.2 
Table 1 presents that countries spend around 5 % of their GDP on education. However, 
what matters for inequality is not only the level of public spending on education, but also 
how it is spent. Finding the level where social returns are the highest seems to be one of 
the key challenges faced by policy makers. Birdsall (1996) states clearly that the level may 
vary across countries. However, based on the higher estimated social returns at the primary 
(and secondary) levels throughout the developing countries, their article has been 
interpreted to discourage public spending on higher education. Restuccia and Urrutia 
(2004) also argue that public spending on early education is more effective than public 
spending on tertiary education in reducing intergenerational persistence on income 
inequality. If children from poor families do not receive adequate levels of early education, 
                                                          




they are not able to build the necessary human capital to attend colleges. As a result, even 
if the college education is provided for free, as long as parental background determines 
who can go to college, free college education is likely to be ineffective in reducing 
intergenerational persistence of income inequality (Filiztekin, 2006). 
Birdsall (1996) explains these findings by contrasting positive externalities arising from 
primary versus higher education. Access to lower education results in lower fertility and 
better health and nutrition, more politically aware citizens, who are more likely to 
contribute to political and social cohesion. Access to higher education does not provide as 
many direct positive externalities. People can capture the full benefits of additional 
education in the form of higher wages and “personal nonpecuniary returns” at lower levels 
than at higher levels of education. Returns are higher at lower levels of schooling, and as 
the public expenditure on primary education mobilizes additional private resources, it 
further increases resource allocation to education. Most importantly investments in primary 
education improve education equity, as additional enrollments come from lower income 
groups rather than from the average students at higher and secondary levels 
(Psacharopolous, 1986).  
These arguments do not discourage investment in tertiary education, they underline that 
in regard to expenditure, most of the funds should be allocated to lower levels of education. 
There are different reasons why governments should keep subsidizing tertiary education. 
If we concentrate on the Turkish case, Caner and Okten (2012) provide two reasons 
supporting the government subsidies for the higher education:  
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1) Borrowing against future human capital is very limited and students from low-
income families have difficulty affording college, even if their private returns to education 
are greater than their costs.  
2) Social returns to higher education are likely to be higher than private returns and 
hence in a free market the level of higher education is likely to be less than the socially 
optimal amount.  
Unlike the findings in other countries, in Turkey, students from higher income and more 
educated families are more likely to enter public universities that receive larger subsidies 
from the government. Given these reasons, Caner and Okten (2012) claim that the 
government should not subsidize the higher education of high income families who even 
in the absence of subsidies are able to afford it. The subsidies should be justified and should 
not result in an income transfer from the poor to the rich. From these discussions, we derive 
additional hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Investments in lower levels of schooling are more effective in decreasing income 
inequality, and 
Hypothesis 3: Investments in higher education need to be justified, so that they do not 















The provided literature discussion gives us opportunity to analyze education equity in 
Turkey with two different approaches. First method is a statistical approach. Following 
O’Donnel’s et al. (2008) guidelines we will measure Kakwani indices and graphically 
illustrate education financing aspects via Lorenz and Concentration curves. Second 
approach is based on our theoretical findings. Following section will provide discussion on 
the Turkish education system. Analyzing the Justice and Development Party projects with 
regards to our hypotheses will help us derive conclusions on the progressivity of the 
education system. 
Our goal is to show whether people benefit equally from the implemented education 
changes. By observing the trends in the out-of-pocket expenditures on education we will 
be able to determine equitability of the system. 
Education 
Expenditure  
Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Australia 8,289 10,932 18,336 
Belgium 9,956 12,763 15,910 
Czech 
Republic 
4,730 7,860 10,432 
France 7,200 11,482 16,194 
Germany 8,103 11,106 16,894 
Norway 13,273 15,282 20,378 
OECD 
Average 
8,477 9,811 N/A 
Poland 6,919 6,505 8,929 
Turkey 2,893 3,589 10,637 
United 
Kingdom 
10,669 12,200 25,743 
United States 10,958 12,739 27,923 
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III. The Turkish Education System 
In Turkey, the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) is the central institution 
regulating primary and secondary education. It includes structures and policies that 
influence pre-primary and higher education as well as non-formal education. The MoNE 
has provincial organizations in 81 cities and 924 districts.  
The general goals of the Turkish education system are: 
1) To raise all individuals as citizens who are committed to the principles and reforms 
of Ataturk and the nationalism of Ataturk as expressed in the Constitution, who adopt, 
protect and promote the national, moral, human, spiritual and cultural values of the Turkish 
Nation, who love and always seek to exalt their families, country and nation, who know 
their duties and responsibilities towards the Republic of Turkey which is a democratic, 
secular and social state governed by the rule of law, founded on human rights and the tenets 
laid down in the preamble to the constitution and who have internalized these in their 
behaviors; 
2) To raise them as constructive, creative and productive persons who are physically, 
mentally, morally, spiritually and emotionally balanced, have a sound personality and 
character, with the ability to think freely and scientifically and have a broad worldview, 
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that are respectful for human rights, value personality and enterprise and feel responsibility 
towards society; 
3) To prepare them for life by developing their interests, talents and capabilities, 
providing them with the necessary knowledge, skills and attitudes and the habit of working 
with others and ensure that they acquire a profession which shall make them happy and 
contribute to the happiness of society; 
4) In this way, to increase the welfare and happiness of Turkish citizens and Turkish 
society, and support and accelerate economic, social and cultural development within 
national unity and cohesion, on the other hand, make the Turkish Nation a constructive, 
creative and distinguished partner of contemporary civilization (MoNE, 2005).  
Pre-primary education is optional for children between 36 to 72 months old. Pre-primary 
attendance has been increasing, but is still very low compared to OECD countries, with 6% 
of children attending in 1996 and 27.6% attending in 2013 (OECD average 83%).  
Primary education is free in public schools and compulsory for all boys and girls, usually 
children start primary education at the age of six or seven and continue for eight years. 
Turkey’s primary education completion rate is high, equaling 99.8% as of 2012. After the 
new legislation on primary and secondary education passed in 2012, eight years of primary 
education were split into two parts, four years of primary education and four years of first 
level primary education. The first level plays a role of middle school, in which students are 
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able to choose whether they want to study at a general education middle school or a 
religious middle school, known as Imam Hatip schools.  
Turkish secondary education is composed of four mandatory years of education. 
Secondary public schools are free of charge. Students are given an option to attend general 
higher-education preparatory or vocational-technical schools.  
At the age of 18, after the successful completion of secondary education, students may 
enter higher education institutions. Higher Education Council administrates all higher 
education institutions, available in both government-supported and private institutions. 
Higher education is provided by universities, high technology instituters, higher vocational 
schools and other off-university higher education institutions (higher police and military 
schools and academies, advanced technology institutes and conservatories). As of 2014, 
there are 190 higher education institutions in Turkey (104 state universities, 72 non-profit 
foundation universities, 8 independent post-secondary vocational school, and 6 other 
higher education institutions).  
Non-formal education in Turkey includes adult education for basic literacy, the 
completion of an interrupted earlier education, healthy lifestyle choices, various kinds of 
professional development, the improvement of scientific and technological skills, and the 
encouragement of “national cultural values”.  
As of 2015, Turkey has a population of 78.7 million, with 16.4 million students at the 
primary and secondary education levels and more than 900 thousand teachers. Extension 
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of compulsory education from 5 to 8 years in 1997 and to 12 years in 2012, has positively 
impacted average years of schooling, however the number is still low, equaling only to 8.1 
years (2015) and falling behind the average of developed countries (11.9 years in 2010). 
When primary, secondary and tertiary educations are combined, the gross enrollment rate 
in Turkey is 95.8% (2013). The female ratio is 93% and the male ratio is 98%.  
Our research focuses on analyzing effects of education policies on education financing. 
As it was mentioned earlier household spending on education in Turkey has been 
increasing. The share of education spending in households’ total expenditures rose from 
2% in 2003 to 2.4% in 2012. In 2011, 13% of all education expenditures were made by 
households. A higher level of inequality along the income distribution is vivid when one 
considers the magnitude of education expenditures rather than its share. The highest 
income group has six times higher income, but ten times higher expenditure on education 
It is impossible to evaluate current conditions of the Turkish education system without 
looking back at its historical development. Although recognizing that “Turkey cannot be 
understood without reference to its Ottoman past” (Zurcher, 1994), we provide brief 
summaries of the periods only after the establishment of the Turkish Republic.  
3.1 Economic and Political Development of the Turkish Education System 
Single Party Period (1923-1946) 
The establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 was not only a change of the political 
regime, but also a cultural transformation, including many educational reforms. The 
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Turkish government introduced the new Latin alphabet and modern educational institutions 
to improve the literacy rate. Number of schools and teachers increased rapidly. During the 
first decade of the republic, number of schools increased by 35%, 15%, 148%, and 88% in 
primary, secondary, high schools and higher educational institutions, respectively. During 
the same period number of enrollments increased by 43% in primary schools, 359% in 
secondary schools, 360% in high schools, and 44% in higher educational institutions. The 
rate of literacy increased from 11% in 1927, to 20.4% in 1935. 
During the single party period the leading function of education was political and 
cultural socialization. It was a tool facilitating the adoption of new social, political and 
cultural values, and supporting the establishment of the newly created nation-state with the 
new institutional structure. In terms of economic progress investment in physical, human 
and financial resources was crucial for the development of the Turkey. The National 
Schools Law passed in 1929, required all citizens between the age of fifteen to forty-five 
to attend reading rooms set up in every village. Later in 1933, Resit Galip (Minister of 
Education) formed the Village Affairs Commission, purpose of which was to create new 
type of village teachers, who would understand villagers’ life and provide practical 
trainings to solve their problems. Mobile Village Women’s Classes and Village Men’s 
Training Classes were introduced in 1938 and 1939 respectively, those training programs 
concentrated on making agricultural and industrial production more productive. 
The key reform implemented by the Turkish Republic during this period was the 
abolishment of duality between secular and religious education. In 1923 MoNE declared 
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that schools had to be loyal to the Republican principles. In 1924, the Law on Unification 
of Education was passed and encouraged establishment of secular education institutions 
based on Western European model, specifically French education system.  
Multi-Party Period (1946-1962) 
“The social changes of early post-war period were of a kind which favored conservative 
rather than innovative policies in education and which did not challenge in any way the 
connection between education and elite recruitment” (Williamson, 1987:103). Even though 
there were improvements in literacy rates from 30% in 1950 and to 40% in 1955, disparities 
between urban and rural education were huge. Low quality of education was limiting the 
progress, in 1956, there were only 7,586 engineers and 910 architects in a population of 25 
million people (Robinson, 1964:155).  
Until the year of 1950 the number of private schools were limited, and were mostly 
composed of special foreign schools. However, the number of private schools gradually 
started to increase. New types of secondary schools “Educational Colleges” (Maarif 
Kolejleri) were established, classification of such schools as ‘private state secondary 
schools’ was an important factor in the provision of public education and served as a signal 
of future establishment of Anatolian Secondary Schools (Anadolu Liseleri refers to public 





Domestic and Foreign Instability (1963-1979) 
Kazamias (1966) compares the Turkish education system of the 1963-1979 to the 
‘minaret’, the proportion of the population enrolled in school at different levels was sharply 
declining at the higher levels of the system. In 1945-6, only 12% of primary school 
graduates started a secondary school. In 1971-2 the rate increased, 42.7% of primary 
graduates continued their education at secondary school (29.5% of girls and 51.3% boys). 
The main criticism of the system during the 70s was based on the inadequacy of lise 
(secondary school) graduates to the demands of university work, the lack of teacher-student 
contact, and the reliance on formal teaching methods and limited text books.  
During this period the number of private institutions continued to increase. There were 
only 57 primary and 36 secondary private schools in 1932. In 1965 numbers increased to 
164 and 76 respectively. The Law on Institutions of Private Education passed in 1965, 
covered private institutions at every level of education. Its Article 2 highlights that these 
institutions cannot be opened for the purpose of making a profit, ‘the purpose of making a 
profit can only be for the implementation of necessary investment and to provide services, 
based on the principles of enhancing the quality and further development of Turkish 
National Education’.  
Private and public investments in higher education were limited. In 1971 there were 
only 9 public universities financed by the Ministry of Education (Williamson, 1987). 
However, Turkish higher education received aid from international community. France 
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helped the University of Ankara to complete a hydraulic laboratory, the British council 
offered language courses, and the Middle East Technical University received funds from 
USAID, CENTRO, the Ford Foundation and OECD.  
Neoliberal Developments (1980-2002) 
The neoliberal economic policies adopted after the military coup in 1980, resulted in the 
wider income gaps and lower social services. The effect on education was the creation of 
a dual system, in which private schools would serve the rich and provide the high-quality 
education, whereas the lower- and middle-income groups would be at public schools with 
diminishing resources.  
The structural adjustment policies imposed by the IMF and adopted by the Turkish 
government on 24 January 1980, encouraged reduction of government spending and 
privatization of the economy and public services. Kemalist approach (founding ideology 
of Republic of Turkey implemented by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) to education as a tool for 
development and modernization was forgotten and neoliberal philosophy was internalized 
by government officials. As a result, financial allocations to education decreased. The 
reduction in educational expenditure was accompanied by a rapid rise in population, from 
20.9 million in 1950, to 44.7 million in 1980 and to 71.2 million in 2000.  
Privatization was not limited only to primary and secondary levels of education. After 
1980s neoliberal policies, private universities appeared as ‘foundation universities’. The 
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word foundation did not sound as radical as the private and was not in conflict with the 
public higher education system.  
Even though enrolment rates were improving, the transition from primary to secondary 
education was still problematic, in 1994-5 only 68.7% had access to the first levels of 
secondary education. The rate of schooling for the overall secondary education was only 
46.5% (1994). 
In 1997, compulsory education increased from 5 to 8 years.  
“The government abolished the traditional diploma that had been awarded at the end of 
the fifth grade, replacing it with a diploma for successful completion of the eighth grade. 
This was a significant move since many students and their families viewed gaining 
primary education diplomas as critical to joining the workforce and therefore, were now 
pressured to complete eight years of education to gain the traditional diploma (Dulger, 
2004:1-2). “ 
The Justice and Development Party Government (2003-2012) 
Even though many reforms were conducted since the year of 2002, mostly the changes 
were made for gaining political advantage, as a result the educational system to large extent 
has stayed the same (Aksit, 2007).  The goal of the government was to minimize public 
support and foster commercialization and marketization through a variety of resources for 
educational funding (Akkaymak, pg. 89). 
During 2002-2011 around 70% of education expenditures were spent on the salaries of 
around 600 thousand personnel (mainly teachers). In addition, the government’s share in 
the educational funding has decreased gradually, while households’ share has been 
increasing. The shares of total joint expenditures for the MoNE and universities, including 
26 
 
revolving funds in GDP were as follows: 4.33% (2002), 4.03% (2005), 4.53% (2007), and 
4.03% (2009). Shares of MoNE in GDP were 3.05% (2007) and 2.72% (2009). Allowances 
to universities (despite the increasing number of students) have decreased from 1.04% 
(2002) to 0.79% (2009) (Akkaymak, 2010:89).  
Decreases in the public expenditure were accompanied by the increases in the household 
spending on education. The highest portions of education expenditures went to the private 
tutoring services (which prepare students for the entrance examinations for private 
secondary, Anatolian secondary schools and all the universities). Number of these private 
institutions increased from 2,122 in 2002, to 4,099 in 2011. Number of teachers in these 
institutions increased from around 20 thousand to 50 thousand, and the number of students 
doubled, from 606 thousand to 1,234 thousand.  
The increase in private preparatory institutions was accompanied with the increase in 
the number of private schools.  From 642 primary and 487 secondary schools in 2001, to 
728 primary level and 650 secondary level schools in 2005, serving 180,090 students and 
76,670 students at primary and secondary levels respectively.  
Aksit (2016) provides two reasons to why enrollments in private schools have been 
increasing. Firstly, public schools are believed to provide insufficient education. with the 
half of the population under the age 25, public schools are overcrowded. The decrease in 
the quality of service provided by public schools leads well-to-do parents to seek 
alternatives in the private education sector, what further deteriorates the public schools. 
Average size in private school classrooms is 20-25 students, whereas in public schools it 
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equals to 60-70 students. In some poor neighborhoods classes have 80-90 students. 
Secondly, higher income groups need private schools to keep their socioeconomic status 
and material advantages (pg.25). The cost of private schools ranges from $3,000 to $13,000 
depending on the school reputation. Private schools also receive subsidies in the form of 
exemption from income and corporate taxes, credits and direct provision of public funds.  
3.2.  Private and Public Spending on Education 
 “In Turkey, the education premium is quite high and households with greater levels of 
schooling manage to earn significantly higher incomes. This in turn contributes to their 
willingness to invest in their children’s education. Thus, intergenerational inequalities 
will be reproduced if educational opportunities are not expanded and made available to 
the poor. Moreover, there are still considerable private and social returns on primary and 
secondary schools; hence, funding these types of education will be beneficial both 
individually and socially” (Duman, 2008:383). 
Acar et al. (2016) find that as of 2012, 3% of an average Turkish household income was 
spent on education. A higher level of inequality along the income distribution is vivid when 
one considers the magnitude of education expenditures rather than its share. The highest 
income group has six times higher income, but ten times higher expenditure on education. 
Between 2003 and 2007, “The average real total household expenditure significantly rose 
by around 50% for all quartiles, whereas the rise is limited to approximately 20% for the 
period 2007-2012” (Acar et al. 2016:12).   
Although public primary education is ‘free’ in Turkey, parents are asked to pay 
registration fees and make ‘voluntary’ donations to schools under the name of ‘parental 
contributions’ (Simsek 2006). Parental contributions amount to substantial sums; for 
instance, in 2003, such parental contributions in primary and secondary education were 
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twice more compared to the government education budget (Keskin and Demirci 2003). The 
AKP government aims to increase the share of private schools in the primary education 
sector, the government proposed a number of measures to promote the establishment of 
private schools with the help of public funds (Altinyelken, 2015).  
Acar et al. (2016) argue that both public and private spending on education has been 
rising. Share of education expenditures in total government spending increased from 6.5% 
in 2002 to 9% in 2012. Most of the budget was used for building schools and classrooms. 
Since 2002 number of new classrooms increased by more than 230,000.  
“The cost of the most recent education reform act called 4+4+4 is calculated as more 
than 50% of the central government’s education budget in 2012. However, education 
expenditures of the central government per student both in primary and secondary level 
are significantly lower than the OECD average” (Acar et al. 2016:7). 
 Because of the limited public spending on primary and secondary education and 
growing private spending Duman (2008) argues that spread between socio-economic 
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investing sufficiently into education: Turkey is spending relatively higher amounts on 
tertiary education while expenditures on primary and secondary education are significantly 
below the OECD averages. However, private and social returns to primary and secondary 
schooling turn out to be quite high in Turkey, investing in these areas could influence the 
education and earning disparities. “Government expenditure is decreasing and becoming 
more biased towards tertiary education, which in turn decreases the chances of poor 
household utilizing these services “(Duman, 2008:370). 
In addition, increase in the private schooling could farther lower the levels of 
intergenerational mobility in education and income. Intergenerational educational mobility 
is one of the lowest among the OECD countries, with 66% of young people having only 
the same level of education as their parents. This influences a low level of intergenerational 
mobility in income and makes it harder for children of poor families to break the poverty 
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Figure 2: Private Education Enrollments 
Source: Akkaymak (2012) 
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Higher education is largely subsidized by the government. According to Caner et al. 
(2012) on average public university students are poorer than those who fail in the exam; 
therefore, public provision of higher education seems to be supporting the poor families. 
“However, the fact that higher income students are more likely to attend higher subsidy 
and better-known universities indicate that there are regressive distributional effects of 
government subsidies for higher education among their recipients” (Caner, 2012:4).   
It is true that the government has implemented many projects, such as the Basic 
Education project (BEP), 1999-2007, aiming to create an information society and spending 
US$1,280,900. Also, including 
“the Catch the Era in Education 2000 project, the Schooling and Credit System, 
curricula laboratory schools, computer laboratory schools, computer experimental 
schools, the High School Graduates’ Vocational Training Programme, the Improving 
Vocational Technical Education project, the Seeing Eye project and the Eskisehir 
Software Base Young Entrepreneur Training Centre (which lost 1 million Turkish lira; 
Minister of Industry and Trade on the behalf of the Prime Ministry, 2009)”, 
however, for most of the cases the Turkish government has made the same mistake, it has 
never evaluated the effectiveness and outcomes of those projects, and simply has declared 
them as a success.  
Government started supporting private schools and providing financial incentives to 
families (on average government subsidizes 20% of full tuition in private kindergartens, 
primary schools and high schools). The government supports private enterprise through tax 
breaks and land grants (Sayılan 2006). The declining public resources and lower quality 
education at public schools have led to an explosive increase in the numbers of private 
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tutoring institutions preparing students for entrance exams to secondary schools and 
universities (Tansel and Bircan 2006). Public education has increasingly come to be seen 
as an outdated concept, and the notion that education is a service which should be bought 
by the consumers has become prevalent (Unal 2005).  Total private education expenditure 
in Turkey is higher than in most of the OECD countries. In 2011, 13% of all education 
expenditures were made by households (Acar et al. 2016).  
3.3 The Key Reforms 
The Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) 
After the economic crisis of 2001, the World Bank and the Turkish government signed 
the loan agreement to start the Turkish CCT program with the implementation of Social 
Risk Mitigation Project (SRMP). The CCT program provides cash payments to poor 
households with the condition that they will meet certain behavioral requirements (usually 
related to the education and health of their children). Originally the CCT program aimed 
to help the poorest 6% of the population, but later under the AKP rule it was extended to 
the poorest 12%. According to the Implementation Completion and Results Report of the 
Social Risk Mitigation Project, as of March 2007, the CCT had a total of 2,68,954 
beneficiaries and the total amount of payments was YTL 794,838,272 (World Bank, 
2008)7. As of 2012, 2,034,065 were benefiting from conditional educational transfers.  
                                                          
7 Ministry of Family and Social Policy. 2012. Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Impact of Conditional Cash 




Interestingly, findings show that most the CCT recipients do not know why they receive 
those transfers. They are also unsure about the source of transfers, some think it is 
municipalities that distribute them, others think it is simply a charity. Households also seem 
to confuse conditional assistance with unconditional money transfers (they do not know 
that they receive more money for girls attending schools than boys, or that the amounts 
vary by the education level).  
Even though the idea of CCTs is to create positive behavioral changes, there does not 
seem to be enough evidence to support assumption that low school enrolment rates, or 
health issues of children, are related to the bad decisions made by poor families. Even in 
the absence of CCTs families still would want to educate their children regardless of their 
gender. The majority of households are aware of the benefits of education, and it is mostly 
economic constraints rather than family behavior that impact the choices. The key 
challenges of CCT in Turkey are inadequate amounts of transfers, exclusion of many 
children and families who are in fact in need of assistance, and irregularity of payments.8 
Nearly 90% of the recipients in Istanbul region find transfers insufficient.9 Even if the CCT 
project succeeds in solving the households’ economic problems, there still are institutional 
and socio-cultural reasons why households refrain from sending their children, and 
                                                          
8 UNICEF. 2014. Türkiye’de Şartlı Nakit Transferi Programının İyileştirilmesine Yönelik Politika [The Policy 
Document for the Improvement of Conditional Cash Transfers in Turkey]. Ministry of Family and Social 
Policy. Belgesi: UNICEF. Accessed June 30. 
 
9 Yoruk, Erdem. 2012. “Welfare Provision as Political Containment: The Politics of Social Assistance and the Kurdish 
Conflict in Turkey.” Politics and Society 40: 517–547. 10.1177/0032329212461130 
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particularly their girls, to school. Among these, supply-side factors such as an inadequate 
number of schools or transportation are very crucial (Pop, 2012).  
As mentioned in the Introduction part of the paper, we are analyzing the burden of the 
out-of-pocket expenditures on education by levels of education, and across income groups. 
Finding out whether or not education financing in Turkey presents a bias against the poor 
and a bias in favor of higher education will help us evaluate the AKP policies and overall 
equity in the Turkish education system. The statistics presented in Table 1 and Table 2 
show that compared to the OECD countries Turkey spends less on education. In addition, 
the public spending in Turkey is biased against the primary and secondary levels of 
education (expenditures on those levels of education are three times less than in the OECD 
countries). These raise concerns regarding the equitability of the education financing. The 
Turkish government heavily invests into tertiary levels, and spends 5% of GDP on 
education (including expenditure of implementation of the projects described above), 
however, are those spending adequate and efficient, do they decrease the inequality, and 
do they lead to improvements in the accessibility of education? It is crucial to answer those 






Law on Making Amendment on Primary Education “4+4+4 Law”10 
On February 21, 2012 draft law “Bill of Amending the Primary Education Law and 
other Laws” was presented to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The ruling Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) proposed a legislation dividing the eight-year primary 
education into two stages, each lasting four years. It also allowed distance education and 
apprenticeship training starting from the age of 10. Even though the discussions in the 
General Assembly were very fierce and NGOs and the opposition heavily criticized the 
proposed legislation, the bill was passed on March 30, 2012.  
The “4+4+4” education system, which was implemented suddenly and without any 
pilot implementation, extended compulsory education to twelve years. Since then it has 
been criticized and supported by the public. “The circles, which approve “4+4+4” 
education system in terms of developmental features of children (Öztürk, 2012), vocational 
education (Öztürk, 2012) and equal opportunities in education (Ünal, 2012), have 
evaluated the practice as a “great step in education” (Erdoğan, 2012).”  The ones who 
opposed it see it as a breakaway from secular and democratic line in education.  
One of the main concerns of the critics is the age of starting primary school was one of 
the main concerns of critics. Previously, children of 72 months were allowed to start school, 
however, with the new law 5 years-old can start their education. This change allows 60 
months children to enter primary school, and therefore requires schools to host two times 
                                                          
10 The reform effects are not measured by our research (as we only look at the years 2004-2012).  Description is simply 
presented to familiarize reader with the Turkish education reforms.  
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more students than before. Schools not only lacked the infrastructure, but also do not have 
teachers and curriculums ready for accepting 60-month-olds.  
 In addition, are concerns regarding the transition to middle schools at the end of the 
fourth grade. Critics state that the fifth grade is too early for children to be “steered away 
from a basic curriculum and be asked to make vocational choices about how to spend the 
rest of their life”11. NGOs and women rights’ groups claim that this reform would “rekindle 
child labor, increase child brides and condemn girls to illiteracy”12. Experts also state that 
the new system would hurt the less privileged: children from poor families or who only 
know Kurdish language, when they enter the first grade, will be hurt when they compete 
for middle school. They will not be able to overcome their handicap by the end of the fourth 
grade and will be unable to perform well on the competitive examinations required for 




                                                          




12 Sevinc K. (2012) “4+4+4 formula in Turkish educational system would increase the number of child marriages and 






Since 1984, there have been several Information and Communications Technology 
(ICT) projects implemented in Turkey, and financed by the government (at a taxpayer cost 
of billions).  
The “FATIH Project” (which stands for Fırsatları Artırma ve Teknolojiyi İyileştirme 
Hareketi, or 'Movement to Increase Opportunities and Technology') was launched in 2011 
and is valued at US$8 billion of the national budget. Its goal is to enhance the technological 
infrastructure of classrooms and to provide all students with tablet computers (distributing 
14 million tablets and 570,000 interactive whiteboards to students and teachers). The 
project has some issues faced not only in Turkey, but in the other countries where similar 
“1-to-1 computing” projects have been implemented.  
“Although many countries are aggressively implementing the One Laptop per Child 
(OLPC) programs, there is lack of empirical evidence on its effects… no evidence is 
found of the program’s effects on enrolment and test scores in Mathematics (numeracy) 
and language.” (Christia et al, p.1) 
Supporters of the project claim that FATIH reform will help Turkey become a 
knowledge society, and lead to a new era. The focus is to equip teachers with knowledge 
and skills, therefore advanced technology should be center of creating better education. 
Opponents emphasize that there are more urgent issues in Turkey such as overcrowded 
classrooms, insufficient school facilities, poor in-service training, paid, contract and 
                                                          




substitute supply teachers, old curricula. Therefore, the FATIH project, which costs US$8 
billion is more of a luxury than an efficient investment.  
The project has risen more concerns after issues of some tables being lost or stolen, 
hundreds of hardwares having technical dysfunctions and some interactive whiteboards 
being delivered to schools but remaining uninstalled. The government has been criticized 
for implementing project and declaring it successful, without ever evaluating whether the 




IV. The Data and Methodology 
4.1 Measurement of Education Equity 
To evaluate the progressivity of the education expenditures we will use the Household 
Budget Surveys collected by the Turkish Statistical Institute between 2004 and 2012. The 
Household Budget surveys provide information on household expenditures, income 
without direct tax, and transfers (including social insurance as well as welfare transfers) 
received. Most crucially the surveys also provide information on education expenditures. 
For the methodology part, we will follow O’Donnel et al. (2008) guidelines on analyzing 
health equity, however, instead of measuring health statistics we will concentrate on 
education indicators. Previous studies mostly estimate equity in education concentrating 
on the public expenditures on higher education. In our study, we will address equity of 
education financing from the individual side, analyzing private out-of-pocket expenditures 
across different income groups and different education levels.   
Instead of using the total income indicators, we substitute them by O’Donnel’s (2008) 
measurement of the “Ability to Pay” (ATP), calculated by division of total household 
expenditures (or total income, total income excluding transfers) by the square root of the 
number of household members. Using ATPs, we will present Lorenz and Concentration 
curves. Lorenz curves will show the proportion of the ATP cumulatively earned by the 
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different income quintiles. It will simply display the ATP distribution. Concentration 
curves show the relationship between the cumulative percentage of the population ranked 
by income (in our case ATP) and the cumulative percentage of education expenditures. 
Concentration curves will present the financial burden of education on different income 
quintiles.  
In addition, we will calculate the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient is defined as 
twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of equality. It takes values between 0 
and 1, where 0 indicates perfect equality and 1 indicates perfect inequality. Also, in order 
to measure degree of socioeconomic inequality we will derive concentration indices, 
defined as twice the area between the concentration curve and the line of equality. 
Concentration index takes values between -1 and 1. Negative concentration index 
represents inequality in financing education. 
 Below you can see mathematical definition of concentration curve.  
(1) C = 1 – 2∫0
1L e(p)dp where e is education related variable and p is population. 




 ∑ 𝑒𝑛𝑖=1 iri – 1– 
1
N
  where ei is the education variable, µ is its mean, and ri is 
the fractional rank2 of individual i in the ATP distribution.  
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Also, concentration index can be defined as the covariance between education 
variable and the fractional rank in the ATP distribution (Lerman and Yizhaki 1989). 
  (3) C = cov(e,r) where e is education variable and r is the fractional rank. 
 Finally, to determine level of inequality composed of income inequality (Gini 
coefficient) and socioeconomic inequality (Concentration index) we will calculate 
Kakwani indices, simply subtracting Gini coefficient from the Concentration index, πK = 
C – G, where C is the concentration index, G is the Gini index, and πK Kakwani index 
ranges from -2 to 1. A negative Kakwani index represents a regressive financing system, 
while a positive index represents a progressive financing system. 
The Household Budget Surveys also provide information on expenditures by education 
levels: primary, middle, high and tertiary. This gives us opportunity to conduct analysis for 
different education levels, therefore we will not only analyze the education financing 
relative to different incomes (incomes excluding social and welfare transfers), but also 
evaluate education financing for different education levels.  
4.2. Data 
The Turkish Statistical Institute has been collecting the Household Budget Surveys 
since the year of 2003. The survey provides information on household expenditures for the 
following items: 
1. Food and Non-alcoholic Beverages 
2. Alcoholic Beverages, Cigarettes, Tobacco, and Other narcotics 
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3. Clothing and Footwear 
4. Housing and Utility systems 
5. Furniture and Other Household Appliances 
6. Health Services 
7. Transportation Services 
8. Communication Services 
9. Recreation 
10. Education Services 
11. Restaurants and Accommodation Services 
12. Other (personal items, insurances, social protection services etc.) 
Using the Household Budget Surveys, we calculate total household expenditures and 
total expenditures on education (item #10 in the list). We are also able to calculate 
education expenditures separately for each level: primary, middle, high school and tertiary 
education expenditures. In addition to the measures on expenditure, the Household Surveys 
provide information on household incomes. The Surveys not only include total yearly 
incomes, but also provide data for the social and welfare transfers. In our research we 
concentrate on measuring out-of-pocket expenditures on education.  
In order to analyze impact of social and welfare transfers on education expenditures, 
we estimated five different indicators of “Ability to Pay” (ATP) by using five different 
income measures: (1) total income; (2) total income excluding welfare transfers (including 
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social transfer); (3) total income excluding social transfers; (4) total income excluding 
welfare and social transfers; and (5) total expenditure.  
To measure amount of social transfers we calculate total revenues from annual pension 
income; annual pension income from abroad; annual widow, orphan salary; and annual 
assistance, scholarships, etc. obtained from abroad. For welfare transfers, we sum up 
revenues received from annual old-age pension; annual social welfare; annual veterancy 
and invalidity wage; annual student scholarship income; annual unemployment benefit; 
annual direct support (fuel, milk payment); annual income from the state; annual child 
support, assistance, etc. obtained from private persons and institutions; and annual income 
from private individuals.  
Table 3 shows the number of households used in our study.  







As a first step, we estimate Lorenz Curves using “Ability to Pay” (ATP) indicators, 
measured in five different ways: 
























ATP4 is estimated by  
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From the five ATPs, firstly we want to distinguish ATP1 and ATP4. Calculating 
education expenditure as a share of total income (ATP1) and total income excluding the 
transfers (ATP4) will allow us to evaluate the household dependence on transfer payments. 
Afterwards, we want to evaluate the role of different types of transfers by formally 
decomposing them into two groups: social transfers and welfare transfers.  
Estimating Lorenz Curves helps us illustrate income inequality. Using ATP measures, 
we calculate Gini indices which display exact income inequality levels.  
For evaluating burden of education financing, we graph the Concentration curves, 
which display the education expenditures (as a share of income) for each quintile. 
Estimation of concentration indices provides information on the expenditure contributions. 
If index is negative it implies disproportionate spending scheme. 
 To calculate Concentration Curves, we use two approaches. First, we calculated 




); and the second method, we divide expenditures for 






Lastly, we measure Kakwani indices (Concentration Index – Gini Index). Kakwani 
index combines income inequality and socio-economic inequality and presents overall 
inequality levels. Index can take values between -1 and 1. Lower the index value more 
regressive (inequitable) is the system, higher the index value more progressive is the 
system.  
4.3. Findings 
Firstly, based on income distribution our findings show that Turkey has been an 
unequal society. Gini coefficients have not improved since the year of 2004 and on average 
have equaled 0.40, which is above the OECD average of 0.315 (2010).  
Secondly, contrary to all the previous researches, we find that during 2004-2012 
education expenditure as a share of income (adjusted to the household size) always 
exceeded 2-3% and was above 7%. Shares of education expenditure vary with the ATPs. 
If we look at the shares of education as a part of total income (ATP1), or total expenditure 
(ATP5) we observe values varying between 7.32% and 10.98%. However, if we look at the 
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     Our results highlight that groups with low incomes highly depend on transfer payments. 
If we do not include transfer payments, poor families spend 2 out of every 10 YTLs on 
education. Whereas groups with high incomes spend only 1 out of every 10 YTLs on 
education. This spending scheme gives high income groups ability to save more than the 
poor families can afford. Assuming the quality of education received by different quintiles 
is same, the system still disadvantages the poor by placing heavier financial burden on 
them.  
 
When we analyze results according to the ATPs, we notice that for the ATP3 and ATP4 
(which exclude social transfers) the poorest quintiles have the highest expenditures (the 
lowest income group spends 16.21% of the income on education, whereas highest income 
group spends only 11.01%).  
For the ATP1 and ATP2 (total income and total income excluding welfare transfers) up 
till the year of 2007, 2nd and 3rd quintile expenditures exceeded expenditures of the other 
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The third and the most important finding is the negative Concentration Index values 
for the majority of the years across all the ATPs. Negative concentration indices imply 
disproportionate burden of education financing and also result in negative Kakwani 
indices. Values of Kakwani indices indicate the regressivity of the system. Furthermore, 
not only Kakwani indices are negative for all the years, but also there are no significant 
improvements during the period of 2004-2012.  
                                                          
14 A= average of 2004, 2005, 2006; B = average of 2007, 2008, 2009; C = average of 2010, 2011, 2012. 
Total Education Expenditures as a share of ATP
1
 (Total Income)14 
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
A 14.96 18.5 18.61 16.67 14.66
B 13.25 12.59 11.3 11.37 11.64
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Figure 5: Total Education Expenditures as a share of ATP1 
Figure 6: Indices for ATP1 
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This means that during the last decade the education system has not seen any 
advancement with regards to financing equity. Inequitable (regressive) system raises 
concerns regarding the social mobility. Higher education expenses as a share of out-of-
pocket expenditures indicate that it will be harder for low-income families to invest in their 
children’s education, and provide them with the opportunities that their high-income peers 
have.  
        If we graphically examine ATP4 (see below graph 1, ATP4) we notice that between 
years 2004 and 2012 the non- transfer income of the poorest quintiles has collapsed. Thus 
we have the higher education expenditure as a share of “Ability to Pay”. Decomposition of 
transfers show that households depend more on social transfers rather than on welfare 
transfers.  
Graph 1:  
ATP1                 
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 2004                            2008                2012       
Table 4:  A = average of 2004, 2005, 2006 
B= average of 2007, 2008, 2009 
C = average of 2010, 2011, 2012 
ATP1 







2004 13.87 18.51 18.86 17.71 14.64 0.407 0.010 -0.398 
2005 15.25 16.93 17.85 16.04 13.83 0.409 -0.023 -0.432 
2006 15.74 20.06 19.12 16.26 15.51 0.377 -0.018 -0.395 
A 14.96 18.50 18.61 16.67 14.66 0.40 -0.01 -0.41 
2007 17.53 17.92 16.54 16.63 15.04 0.382 -0.329 -0.711 
2008 11.71 10.46 8.67 8.45 10.56 0.392 -0.036 -0.428 
2009 10.53 9.41 8.69 9.02 9.32 0.410 -0.025 -0.435 
B 13.25 12.59 11.30 11.37 11.64 0.39 -0.13 -0.52 
2010 10.04 7.88 7.07 9.81 8.90 0.437 -0.004 -0.441 
2011 9.32 8.35 7.83 8.59 10.50 0.401 0.025 -0.376 
2012 10.90 8.34 8.32 8.83 11.80 0.384 0.019 -0.365 











2004 14.33 18.23 19.45 17.77 14.60 0.410 0.006 -0.404 
2005 15.98 17.71 17.77 15.88 14.07 0.412 -0.031 -0.443 
2006 16.79 20.14 19.77 16.07 15.74 0.381 -0.023 -0.404 
A 15.70 18.69 19.00 16.58 14.81 0.40 -0.02 -0.42 
2007 17.95 18.58 16.67 16.42 15.30 0.385 -0.036 -0.421 
2008 13.36 11.08 9.15 8.36 10.82 0.404 -0.066 -0.470 
2009 13.53 9.41 9.44 9.45 9.34 0.423 -0.072 -0.495 
B 14.94 13.02 11.75 11.41 11.82 0.40 -0.06 -0.46 
2010 11.23 8.29 7.60 9.96 8.92 0.448 -0.026 -0.474 
2011 11.29 8.82 8.18 8.94 10.72 0.412 -0.013 -0.425 
2012 13.85 8.39 8.44 8.89 12.22 0.396 -0.027 -0.423 












2004 23.02 20.32 19.92 20.00 15.62 0.433 -0.058 -0.491 
2005 23.33 20.55 19.26 18.03 14.05 0.433 -0.093 -0.526 
2006 25.17 21.75 18.21 19.86 16.08 0.401 -0.079 -0.480 
A 23.84 20.87 19.13 19.30 15.25 0.42 -0.08 -0.50 
2007 25.85 22.38 17.80 17.45 15.82 0.409 -0.106 -0.515 
2008 19.45 12.18 10.18 9.84 10.67 0.425 -0.136 -0.561 
2009 17.10 11.97 8.81 9.53 9.94 0.443 -0.121 -0.564 
B 20.80 15.51 12.26 12.27 12.14 0.43 -0.12 -0.55 
2010 15.67 10.64 8.99 9.82 9.11 0.471 -0.102 -0.573 
2011 14.85 9.45 9.19 9.57 10.97 0.436 -0.060 -0.496 
2012 18.12 10.29 9.20 9.35 12.94 0.422 -0.086 -0.508 











2004 23.94 19.96 20.37 20.24 15.56 0.436 -0.063 -0.499 
2005 24.39 21.40 19.71 17.46 14.45 0.436 -0.101 -0.537 
2006 25.60 22.82 18.95 19.93 16.37 0.406 -0.086 -0.492 
A 24.64 21.39 19.68 19.21 15.46 0.43 -0.08 -0.51 
2007 26.78 22.75 17.73 17.95 15.93 0.412 -0.110 -0.522 
2008 21.52 13.47 10.68 9.96 10.86 0.438 -0.163 -0.601 
2009 20.98 12.48 9.79 9.79 10.41 0.457 -0.160 -0.617 
B 23.09 16.23 12.73 12.57 12.40 0.44 -0.14 -0.58 
2010 17.55 11.79 9.40 9.60 9.45 0.483 -0.124 -0.607 
2011 17.78 10.49 9.56 9.96 11.27 0.450 -0.101 -0.551 
2012 21.92 10.54 9.60 9.68 13.14 0.437 -0.126 -0.563 
C 19.08 10.94 9.52 9.74 11.28 0.46 -0.12 -0.57 
 
ATP5 







2004 12.44 17.81 16.52 17.33 17.24 0.336 0.056 -0.280 
2005 10.53 13.83 16.47 16.21 13.68 0.355 0.053 -0.302 
2006 13.14 16.72 17.39 15.79 15.67 0.333 0.026 -0.308 
A 12.04 16.12 16.79 16.44 15.53 0.34 0.04 -0.30 
2007 13.51 15.12 16.28 15.65 16.16 0.319 0.030 -0.289 
2008 8.19 8.72 8.55 8.00 10.99 0.327 0.046 -0.281 
2009 7.39 8.00 8.27 8.27 11.13 0.333 0.078 -0.255 
B 9.70 10.61 11.03 10.64 12.76 0.33 0.05 -0.28 
2010 7.29 7.09 7.55 8.24 10.11 0.374 0.089 -0.285 
2011 7.14 7.01 7.83 8.10 11.06 0.352 0.095 -0.257 
2012 7.68 7.85 7.88 8.95 11.78 0.348 0.091 -0.257 




Analysis of education expenditures by education levels lead to additional conclusions. 
Income groups spend most on the high school education, however, the richest quintile 
spends most on the primary education. This trend can be explained by the following 
argument: High-income families know that investments in the earlier stages of education 
are more effective, if student gets better quality of education from the primary school, s/he 
will be able to perform better in the higher levels of education as well. For the poor quintiles 
story is a little bit different, they invest most on high school education because high school 
is a final step before entering the tertiary institution. Low-income families do their best at 
the high school level (by spending the most) in order to provide their children with 
resources sufficient for performing well on national university examinations. Expenses 
during high school education increase due to the additional cost accrued from services 
provided by private preparatory institutions (tutoring classes outside of regular schools).  
 If we evaluate school levels in terms of regressivity (Kakwani index), we observe that 
the secondary education, specifically high school expenditures are most inequitable 










Primary Middle School High School Tertiary
Kakwani Indices by Educational Level
2004 2008 2012
Figure 7: Kakwani Indices by Educational Level 
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The tertiary education is the second most inequitable (Kakwani index value of -0.42), 
which implies that even though government has been investing heavily into tertiary 
education, we still do not see any significant improvements in terms of progressivity of the 
tertiary system. On the contrary, expenditures of the poorest quintiles have been increasing, 
whereas expenditures of the richest quintiles have either stayed the same or even slightly 
decreased. This indicates that subsidies to tertiary level education have benefited the richest 
quintiles rather than the poor.  
Table 5: Primary = average of 2004, 2008, 2012; Middle School = average of 2004, 2008, 2012 
High School = average of 2004, 2008, 2012; Tertiary = average of 2004, 2008, 2012 
ATP1 
 







Primary 1.81 1.58 2.15 1.91 3.72 0.40 0.16 -0.24 
2004 2.76 2.07 3.79 2.78 3.97 0.413 0.087 -0.326 
2008 0.91 0.98 0.77 0.80 2.52 0.394 0.210 -0.184 
2012 1.77 1.70 1.89 2.15 4.67 0.386 0.188 -0.198 
Mid. School 1.82 2.33 2.42 2.40 2.70 0.40 0.02 -0.38 
2004 1.84 3.84 3.42 3.43 2.83 0.413 0.018 -0.395 
2008 2.43 2.15 2.69 2.16 3.29 0.394 -0.045 -0.439 
2012 1.20 0.99 1.15 1.61 1.98 0.386 0.088 -0.298 
High School 4.49 4.63 4.59 3.79 2.45 0.40 -0.22 -0.62 
2004 5.18 7.97 8.14 6.86 3.77 0.413 -0.176 -0.589 
2008 4.15 3.64 3.02 2.62 2.09 0.394 -0.244 -0.638 
2012 4.14 2.27 2.62 1.91 1.50 0.386 -0.245 -0.631 
Tertiary 0.89 1.00 1.36 1.26 2.23 0.40 -0.03 -0.42 
2004 0.71 1.09 1.20 1.18 2.18 0.413 -0.061 -0.474 
2008 0.79 0.61 1.37 1.07 1.75 0.394 -0.043 -0.437 











Primary 2.00 1.63 2.12 1.97 3.78 0.41 0.14 -0.27 
2004 2.76 2.08 3.83 2.75 4.01 0.416 0.086 -0.330 
2008 0.91 1.13 0.74 0.83 2.56 0.408 0.188 -0.220 
2012 2.33 1.66 1.79 2.33 4.77 0.402 0.143 -0.259 
Mid. School 2.33 2.19 2.45 2.51 2.70 0.41 -0.01 -0.42 
2004 2.76 3.26 3.39 3.44 2.83 0.416 0.002 -0.414 
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2008 2.66 2.37 2.75 2.37 3.24 0.408 -0.073 -0.481 
2012 1.56 0.93 1.21 1.71 2.02 0.402 0.037 -0.365 
High School 4.69 4.88 4.50 4.01 2.49 0.41 -0.23 -0.64 
2004 5.44 8.24 7.77 7.07 3.77 0.416 -0.180 -0.596 
2008 3.81 4.04 3.27 2.77 2.21 0.408 -0.249 -0.657 
2012 4.84 2.38 2.46 2.18 1.50 0.402 -0.270 -0.672 
Tertiary 1.15 1.10 1.40 1.48 2.21 0.41 -0.28 -0.69 
2004 0.71 1.10 1.39 1.60 2.18 0.416 -0.066 -0.482 
2008 0.86 0.79 1.42 1.11 1.70 0.408 -0.732 -1.140 











Primary 2.25 1.87 2.12 2.23 4.15 0.45 0.08 -0.38 
2004 3.10 2.66 3.55 3.27 4.63 0.472 0.039 -0.433 
2008 1.38 0.92 1.14 0.97 2.62 0.444 0.077 -0.367 
2012 2.27 2.04 1.68 2.46 5.19 0.434 0.109 -0.325 
Mid. School 3.10 2.84 2.82 2.74 2.85 0.45 -0.08 -0.53 
2004 3.89 4.78 3.43 4.03 2.96 0.472 -0.097 -0.569 
2008 3.68 2.75 3.33 2.61 3.45 0.444 -0.151 -0.595 
2012 1.72 0.98 1.71 1.59 2.15 0.434 0.004 -0.430 
High School 5.78 6.32 5.60 5.09 2.36 0.45 -0.28 -0.73 
2004 6.54 10.41 9.46 9.13 3.67 0.472 -0.232 -0.704 
2008 5.85 4.98 4.19 3.01 2.03 0.444 -0.312 -0.756 
2012 4.94 3.57 3.14 3.14 1.39 0.434 -0.285 -0.719 
Tertiary 2.52 1.85 1.53 1.81 2.15 0.45 -0.19 -0.64 
2004 0.80 2.38 2.05 2.08 1.60 0.472 -0.179 -0.651 
2008 2.22 1.28 1.05 1.71 1.70 0.444 -0.183 -0.627 












Primary 2.46 2.27 2.73 2.51 4.00 0.47 0.04 -0.43 
2004 2.95 2.87 3.52 3.29 4.64 0.477 0.038 -0.439 
2008 1.49 1.06 1.16 0.94 2.73 0.453 0.043 -0.410 
2012 2.95 2.87 3.52 3.29 4.64 0.477 0.038 -0.439 
Mid. School 3.66 2.91 2.80 2.77 2.93 0.46 -0.11 -0.57 
2004 4.49 4.57 3.31 4.14 2.97 0.477 -0.107 -0.584 
2008 4.25 3.04 3.43 2.60 3.54 0.453 -0.179 -0.632 
2012 2.25 1.14 1.66 1.59 2.27 0.448 -0.054 -0.502 
High School 5.82 6.67 5.83 5.20 2.38 0.46 -0.29 -0.74 
2004 6.62 10.31 9.77 9.23 3.67 0.477 -0.232 -0.709 
2008 5.62 5.42 4.56 3.23 2.10 0.453 -0.315 -0.768 
2012 5.23 4.26 3.15 3.15 1.38 0.448 -0.310 -0.758 
Tertiary 2.89 2.12 1.61 1.78 2.18 0.46 -0.22 -0.68 
2004 0.89 2.31 2.24 2.00 1.61 0.477 -0.185 -0.662 
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2008 2.43 1.46 1.18 1.71 1.74 0.453 -0.211 -0.664 











Primary 1.51 1.60 1.43 2.25 3.56 0.34 0.22 -0.12 
2004 2.59 2.86 1.98 3.53 3.95 0.346 0.136 -0.210 
2008 0.72 0.58 0.85 0.85 2.38 0.327 0.278 -0.049 
2012 1.23 1.36 1.46 2.37 4.36 0.348 0.254 -0.094 
Mid. School 1.71 2.32 2.27 2.27 2.56 0.34 0.07 -0.27 
2004 2.31 3.42 3.25 3.35 2.57 0.346 0.069 -0.277 
2008 1.82 2.67 2.37 2.06 3.14 0.327 0.011 -0.317 
2012 1.02 0.88 1.19 1.41 1.98 0.348 0.137 -0.211 
High School 3.90 4.32 4.30 3.42 2.14 0.34 -0.15 -0.49 
2004 5.92 7.53 7.98 6.33 2.99 0.346 -0.144 -0.490 
2008 2.86 3.07 2.68 2.58 2.08 0.327 -0.145 -0.472 
2012 2.91 2.36 2.24 1.34 1.34 0.348 -0.173 -0.521 
Tertiary 0.67 0.90 1.18 1.75 2.21 0.34 0.03 -0.31 
2004 0.47 0.79 1.11 1.52 2.40 0.346 -0.034 -0.380 
2008 0.52 0.71 0.92 1.19 1.69 0.327 0.040 -0.287 
2012 1.03 1.19 1.53 2.54 2.54 0.348 0.070 -0.278 
 
These statistical findings are also supported by the theoretical discussion presented 
earlier in the literature review section. Ineffective educational policies and reductions in 
public spending not only failed to improve the inequality levels in Turkey, but at some 
educational levels even increased it (Hypothesis I). In addition, increases in tertiary 
education spending rather than investments in secondary levels of schooling highlight the 
importance of Hypothesis 2: Investments in lower levels of schooling are more effective in 
decreasing income inequality, and Hypothesis 3: Investments in higher education need to 
be justified, that they do not exacerbate the inequality levels. Poor have been financially 
most vulnerable and, except the decreases in absolute values of education expenditures 
have not seen improvements in the equitability of the system, the argument that education 
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in Turkey became more accessible to poor and the education policies have decreased the 
inequality are not supported by our findings.  
It is important to remember that the education policies conducted by the Turkish 
government are financed by the tax revenues, poor have only limited (or no) access to 






      “Whatever you do, do it well”. Walter E. Disney 
 
In this paper we analyzed equity in financing education in Turkey. We used the 
Household Budget Surveys to calculate total education expenditures and ATPs of 
households for the years 2004-2012. To measure inequality levels, we calculated Gini, 
Concentration and Kakwani indices. 
Our findings present that since the year of 2004 there were no significant improvements 
in the distribution of education financing. By estimating Kakwani indices we found that 
the Turkish education system has been regressive and no significant improvements have 
been observed. The poorest quintiles have had the highest shares of education expenditures 
since the year of 2008. The crucial finding is that the high school education is the most 
inequitable, and the high public expenditures on the tertiary education are not justified, as 
they seem to benefit the rich more than the poor. These findings raise concerns regarding 
the intergenerational mobility of individuals. If it is low-income quintiles that face the 
heaviest burden of education financing, then the social mobility (by investing in human 
capital) becomes very challenging.  
Our research also upholds previous hypotheses regarding the significance of public 
spending on education, and the importance of effective distribution of finances among 
education levels. Our results show that simple provision of education policies does not lead  
57 
 
to any improvements in the progressivity of the system. If the lack of education contributes 
to the perpetuation of inequality, and social and income inequalities have negative effects 
on economic and political environments, then it is in the interest of the Turkish government 
to implement effective education policies. By failing to evaluate effectiveness of already 
implemented policies, Turkish government not only impoverishes the poor, but also loses 
potential to attain more stable economic growth levels in the long run.  
The scope of our research is very limited as it only covers the time between 2004-2012, 
however, by analyzing education equity during the Justice and Development Party period 
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Distributions of income and burdens of education expenditure presented for different years 
and different income types.  
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Where ATP4 is estimated by  
Total Income− Transfers(Welfare and Social)
number of households
 . 
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2004 13.87 18.51 18.86 17.71 14.64 0.407 0.010 -0.398 
2005 15.25 16.93 17.85 16.04 13.83 0.409 -0.023 -0.432 
2006 15.74 20.06 19.12 16.26 15.51 0.377 -0.018 -0.395 
A 14.96 18.50 18.61 16.67 14.66 0.40 -0.01 -0.41 
2007 17.53 17.92 16.54 16.63 15.04 0.382 -0.329 -0.711 
2008 11.71 10.46 8.67 8.45 10.56 0.392 -0.036 -0.428 
2009 10.53 9.41 8.69 9.02 9.32 0.410 -0.025 -0.435 
B 13.25 12.59 11.30 11.37 11.64 0.39 -0.13 -0.52 
2010 10.04 7.88 7.07 9.81 8.90 0.437 -0.004 -0.441 
2011 9.32 8.35 7.83 8.59 10.50 0.401 0.025 -0.376 
2012 10.90 8.34 8.32 8.83 11.80 0.384 0.019 -0.365 
C 10.09 8.19 7.74 9.08 10.40 0.41 0.01 -0.39 
 
ATP2 







2004 14.33 18.23 19.45 17.77 14.60 0.410 0.006 -0.404 
2005 15.98 17.71 17.77 15.88 14.07 0.412 -0.031 -0.443 
2006 16.79 20.14 19.77 16.07 15.74 0.381 -0.023 -0.404 
A 15.70 18.69 19.00 16.58 14.81 0.40 -0.02 -0.42 
2007 17.95 18.58 16.67 16.42 15.30 0.385 -0.036 -0.421 
2008 13.36 11.08 9.15 8.36 10.82 0.404 -0.066 -0.470 
2009 13.53 9.41 9.44 9.45 9.34 0.423 -0.072 -0.495 
B 14.94 13.02 11.75 11.41 11.82 0.40 -0.06 -0.46 
2010 11.23 8.29 7.60 9.96 8.92 0.448 -0.026 -0.474 
2011 11.29 8.82 8.18 8.94 10.72 0.412 -0.013 -0.425 
2012 13.85 8.39 8.44 8.89 12.22 0.396 -0.027 -0.423 
C 12.12 8.50 8.07 9.26 10.62 0.42 -0.02 -0.44 
 
ATP3 







2004 23.02 20.32 19.92 20.00 15.62 0.433 -0.058 -0.491 
2005 23.33 20.55 19.26 18.03 14.05 0.433 -0.093 -0.526 
2006 25.17 21.75 18.21 19.86 16.08 0.401 -0.079 -0.480 
A 23.84 20.87 19.13 19.30 15.25 0.42 -0.08 -0.50 
2007 25.85 22.38 17.80 17.45 15.82 0.409 -0.106 -0.515 
2008 19.45 12.18 10.18 9.84 10.67 0.425 -0.136 -0.561 
2009 17.10 11.97 8.81 9.53 9.94 0.443 -0.121 -0.564 
B 20.80 15.51 12.26 12.27 12.14 0.43 -0.12 -0.55 
2010 15.67 10.64 8.99 9.82 9.11 0.471 -0.102 -0.573 
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2011 14.85 9.45 9.19 9.57 10.97 0.436 -0.060 -0.496 
2012 18.12 10.29 9.20 9.35 12.94 0.422 -0.086 -0.508 
C 16.21 10.13 9.13 9.58 11.01 0.44 -0.08 -0.53 
 
ATP4 







2004 23.94 19.96 20.37 20.24 15.56 0.436 -0.063 -0.499 
2005 24.39 21.40 19.71 17.46 14.45 0.436 -0.101 -0.537 
2006 25.60 22.82 18.95 19.93 16.37 0.406 -0.086 -0.492 
A 24.64 21.39 19.68 19.21 15.46 0.43 -0.08 -0.51 
2007 26.78 22.75 17.73 17.95 15.93 0.412 -0.110 -0.522 
2008 21.52 13.47 10.68 9.96 10.86 0.438 -0.163 -0.601 
2009 20.98 12.48 9.79 9.79 10.41 0.457 -0.160 -0.617 
B 23.09 16.23 12.73 12.57 12.40 0.44 -0.14 -0.58 
2010 17.55 11.79 9.40 9.60 9.45 0.483 -0.124 -0.607 
2011 17.78 10.49 9.56 9.96 11.27 0.450 -0.101 -0.551 
2012 21.92 10.54 9.60 9.68 13.14 0.437 -0.126 -0.563 
C 19.08 10.94 9.52 9.74 11.28 0.46 -0.12 -0.57 
 
ATP5 







2004 12.44 17.81 16.52 17.33 17.24 0.336 0.056 -0.280 
2005 10.53 13.83 16.47 16.21 13.68 0.355 0.053 -0.302 
2006 13.14 16.72 17.39 15.79 15.67 0.333 0.026 -0.308 
A 12.04 16.12 16.79 16.44 15.53 0.34 0.04 -0.30 
2007 13.51 15.12 16.28 15.65 16.16 0.319 0.030 -0.289 
2008 8.19 8.72 8.55 8.00 10.99 0.327 0.046 -0.281 
2009 7.39 8.00 8.27 8.27 11.13 0.333 0.078 -0.255 
B 9.70 10.61 11.03 10.64 12.76 0.33 0.05 -0.28 
2010 7.29 7.09 7.55 8.24 10.11 0.374 0.089 -0.285 
2011 7.14 7.01 7.83 8.10 11.06 0.352 0.095 -0.257 
2012 7.68 7.85 7.88 8.95 11.78 0.348 0.091 -0.257 









Distributions of income and burdens of education expenditure presented for different 
education levels, years and income types. 
1) Primary Education, ATP1 
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Primary Education, ATP2 










                           




Primary Education, ATP3 









                 




Primary Education, ATP4 




    Where ATP4 is estimated by  




                     
    Graph 1: 2008      Graph 2: 2012 
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Primary Education, ATP5 









                  




2) Middle School Education, ATP1 
Concentration curve is calculated by  
Middle School education expenditures
ATP1
.  






                              
    Graph 1: 2008      Graph 2: 2012 
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Middle School Education, ATP2 
Concentration curve is calculated by  
Middle School education expenditures
ATP2
.  
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Middle School Education, ATP3 
Concentration curve is calculated by  
Middle School education expenditures
ATP3
.  
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Middle School Education, ATP4 
Concentration curve is calculated by  
Middle School education expenditures
ATP4
.  
   Where ATP4 is estimated by  
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Middle School Education, ATP5 
Concentration curve is calculated by  
Middle School education expenditures
ATP5
.  




              




3) High School Education, ATP1 
Concentration curve is calculated by  
High School education expenditures
ATP1
.  
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High School Education, ATP2 
Concentration curve is calculated by  
High School education expenditures
ATP2
.  
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High School Education, ATP3 
Concentration curve is calculated by  
High School education expenditures
ATP3
.  
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High School Education, ATP4 
Concentration curve is calculated by  
High School education expenditures
ATP4
.  
   Where ATP4 is estimated by  
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High School Education, ATP5 
Concentration curve is calculated by  
High School education expenditures
ATP5
.  
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4) Tertiary Education, ATP1 








                  
  Graph 1: 2008                                Graph 2: 2012 
82 
 
Tertiary Education, ATP2 
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Tertiary Education, ATP3 








          




Tertiary Education, ATP4 




   Where ATP4 is estimated by  
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Tertiary Education, ATP5 








          











Primary 1.81 1.58 2.15 1.91 3.72 0.40 0.16 -0.24 
2004 2.76 2.07 3.79 2.78 3.97 0.413 0.087 -0.326 
2008 0.91 0.98 0.77 0.80 2.52 0.394 0.210 -0.184 
2012 1.77 1.70 1.89 2.15 4.67 0.386 0.188 -0.198 
Mid. School 1.82 2.33 2.42 2.40 2.70 0.40 0.02 -0.38 
2004 1.84 3.84 3.42 3.43 2.83 0.413 0.018 -0.395 
2008 2.43 2.15 2.69 2.16 3.29 0.394 -0.045 -0.439 
2012 1.20 0.99 1.15 1.61 1.98 0.386 0.088 -0.298 
High School 4.49 4.63 4.59 3.79 2.45 0.40 -0.22 -0.62 
2004 5.18 7.97 8.14 6.86 3.77 0.413 -0.176 -0.589 
2008 4.15 3.64 3.02 2.62 2.09 0.394 -0.244 -0.638 
2012 4.14 2.27 2.62 1.91 1.50 0.386 -0.245 -0.631 
Tertiary 0.89 1.00 1.36 1.26 2.23 0.40 -0.03 -0.42 
2004 0.71 1.09 1.20 1.18 2.18 0.413 -0.061 -0.474 
2008 0.79 0.61 1.37 1.07 1.75 0.394 -0.043 -0.437 











Primary 2.00 1.63 2.12 1.97 3.78 0.41 0.14 -0.27 
2004 2.76 2.08 3.83 2.75 4.01 0.416 0.086 -0.330 
2008 0.91 1.13 0.74 0.83 2.56 0.408 0.188 -0.220 
2012 2.33 1.66 1.79 2.33 4.77 0.402 0.143 -0.259 
Mid. School 2.33 2.19 2.45 2.51 2.70 0.41 -0.01 -0.42 
2004 2.76 3.26 3.39 3.44 2.83 0.416 0.002 -0.414 
2008 2.66 2.37 2.75 2.37 3.24 0.408 -0.073 -0.481 
2012 1.56 0.93 1.21 1.71 2.02 0.402 0.037 -0.365 
High School 4.69 4.88 4.50 4.01 2.49 0.41 -0.23 -0.64 
2004 5.44 8.24 7.77 7.07 3.77 0.416 -0.180 -0.596 
2008 3.81 4.04 3.27 2.77 2.21 0.408 -0.249 -0.657 
2012 4.84 2.38 2.46 2.18 1.50 0.402 -0.270 -0.672 
Tertiary 1.15 1.10 1.40 1.48 2.21 0.41 -0.28 -0.69 
2004 0.71 1.10 1.39 1.60 2.18 0.416 -0.066 -0.482 
2008 0.86 0.79 1.42 1.11 1.70 0.408 -0.732 -1.140 














Primary 2.25 1.87 2.12 2.23 4.15 0.45 0.08 -0.38 
2004 3.10 2.66 3.55 3.27 4.63 0.472 0.039 -0.433 
2008 1.38 0.92 1.14 0.97 2.62 0.444 0.077 -0.367 
2012 2.27 2.04 1.68 2.46 5.19 0.434 0.109 -0.325 
Mid. School 3.10 2.84 2.82 2.74 2.85 0.45 -0.08 -0.53 
2004 3.89 4.78 3.43 4.03 2.96 0.472 -0.097 -0.569 
2008 3.68 2.75 3.33 2.61 3.45 0.444 -0.151 -0.595 
2012 1.72 0.98 1.71 1.59 2.15 0.434 0.004 -0.430 
High School 5.78 6.32 5.60 5.09 2.36 0.45 -0.28 -0.73 
2004 6.54 10.41 9.46 9.13 3.67 0.472 -0.232 -0.704 
2008 5.85 4.98 4.19 3.01 2.03 0.444 -0.312 -0.756 
2012 4.94 3.57 3.14 3.14 1.39 0.434 -0.285 -0.719 
Tertiary 2.52 1.85 1.53 1.81 2.15 0.45 -0.19 -0.64 
2004 0.80 2.38 2.05 2.08 1.60 0.472 -0.179 -0.651 
2008 2.22 1.28 1.05 1.71 1.70 0.444 -0.183 -0.627 











Primary 2.46 2.27 2.73 2.51 4.00 0.47 0.04 -0.43 
2004 2.95 2.87 3.52 3.29 4.64 0.477 0.038 -0.439 
2008 1.49 1.06 1.16 0.94 2.73 0.453 0.043 -0.410 
2012 2.95 2.87 3.52 3.29 4.64 0.477 0.038 -0.439 
Mid. School 3.66 2.91 2.80 2.77 2.93 0.46 -0.11 -0.57 
2004 4.49 4.57 3.31 4.14 2.97 0.477 -0.107 -0.584 
2008 4.25 3.04 3.43 2.60 3.54 0.453 -0.179 -0.632 
2012 2.25 1.14 1.66 1.59 2.27 0.448 -0.054 -0.502 
High School 5.82 6.67 5.83 5.20 2.38 0.46 -0.29 -0.74 
2004 6.62 10.31 9.77 9.23 3.67 0.477 -0.232 -0.709 
2008 5.62 5.42 4.56 3.23 2.10 0.453 -0.315 -0.768 
2012 5.23 4.26 3.15 3.15 1.38 0.448 -0.310 -0.758 
Tertiary 2.89 2.12 1.61 1.78 2.18 0.46 -0.22 -0.68 
2004 0.89 2.31 2.24 2.00 1.61 0.477 -0.185 -0.662 
2008 2.43 1.46 1.18 1.71 1.74 0.453 -0.211 -0.664 














Primary 1.51 1.60 1.43 2.25 3.56 0.34 0.22 -0.12 
2004 2.59 2.86 1.98 3.53 3.95 0.346 0.136 -0.210 
2008 0.72 0.58 0.85 0.85 2.38 0.327 0.278 -0.049 
2012 1.23 1.36 1.46 2.37 4.36 0.348 0.254 -0.094 
Mid. School 1.71 2.32 2.27 2.27 2.56 0.34 0.07 -0.27 
2004 2.31 3.42 3.25 3.35 2.57 0.346 0.069 -0.277 
2008 1.82 2.67 2.37 2.06 3.14 0.327 0.011 -0.317 
2012 1.02 0.88 1.19 1.41 1.98 0.348 0.137 -0.211 
High School 3.90 4.32 4.30 3.42 2.14 0.34 -0.15 -0.49 
2004 5.92 7.53 7.98 6.33 2.99 0.346 -0.144 -0.490 
2008 2.86 3.07 2.68 2.58 2.08 0.327 -0.145 -0.472 
2012 2.91 2.36 2.24 1.34 1.34 0.348 -0.173 -0.521 
Tertiary 0.67 0.90 1.18 1.75 2.21 0.34 0.03 -0.31 
2004 0.47 0.79 1.11 1.52 2.40 0.346 -0.034 -0.380 
2008 0.52 0.71 0.92 1.19 1.69 0.327 0.040 -0.287 
2012 1.03 1.19 1.53 2.54 2.54 0.348 0.070 -0.278 
 
 
 
 
 
 
